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Summary
Reflecting the growing popularity of the dialogical self in psychology this contribution searches for a
psychological theory of dialogue. First, the social constructionist proposal is discussed, considering
the constructionist concept of social practice and the model of the individual participant in this
practice it implies. Second, drawing from Bakhtins notion of dialogicality, it is suggested in line with
constructionism that dialogues are basically a form of shared social practice. However, the
dialogical character of this practice is subject to certain preconditions; and as these include
competencies and motives of the participants in dialogue they imply changes for the
conceptualization of a dialogical self.
Key words: dialogical self, dialogue, social constructionism, implicit knowledge, aboutness
Zusammenfassung
Besser scheitern. Überlegungen, Kommentare und Fragen angesichts eines
konstruktionistischen Dialogkonzepts
Ausgehend von der wachsenden Aufmerksamkeit für die Konzeption eines dialogischen Selbst in
der Psychologie befasst sich der Beitrag mit der Frage nach einer psychologischen Theorie des
Dialogs. Als ein viel versprechender Entwurf wird zunächst die sozialkonstruktionistische
Auffassung skizziert; daran anschließend werden kritische und weiterführende Fragen diskutiert.
Den Abschluss bildet der auf Bachtins Dialogkonzept zurückgreifende Vorschlag, Dialoge wie im
sozialen Konstruktionismus als geteilte, soziale Praxis zu betrachten. Allerdings werden für deren
dialogischen Charakter Voraussetzungen angenommen, die sich auf Kompetenzen und Motive der
handelnden Dialogteilnehmer beziehen und damit auch die Theorie des dialogischen Selbst
verändern.
Schlagwörter: Dialog, dialogisches Selbst, Sozialer Konstruktionismus, Praxistheorie, implizites
Wissen, Intentionalität
Introduction: Bakhtin and the new grip on
dialogism in psychology
Language lives according to Michail Bakhtin only in the dialogic interaction of those who make
use of it (1979, p. 183). The speaking of words or utterances is a living social process where in
each and every word the one, the addresser, is in relation to the other, the adressee (Voloshinov,
1973, p. 86). This concept of the dialogical interaction is directed against a unifying conception of
meaning and language, but it leads Bakhtin further: to a rejection of an individualistic,
psychological conception of the subject. The meaning of a word, an utterance, a text is not
determined and not product of one author  just like the self is neither an individual project nor a
determined or stable construal. Both, word meaning and personal identity, exist on the interface of
socio-cultural discourses and relationships.
In academic psychology Bakhtins account of dialogism is particularly manifest in the numerous
Journal für Psychologie: jfp-2-2009-03 | ISSN 0942-2285
Seite 1 von 12
writings and researches on the dialogical self. The concept first became popular in the writings of
cultural psychology, social constructionism, or critical social psychology (for example Hermans &
Kempen 1993; Gergen, 1994; Billig,1996) and soon disseminated not only within psychology via
numerous researches or publications, but also in other field of the so called cultural sciences.1
Why this popularity? The concept of the dialogical self is perfect, it seems, to emphasize in an
illustrative way how psychology can and may adapt to the changing conditions of modern,
globalized societies: the model not only illustrates how the individual self is embedded in cultural
dialogues, but also that the idea of an individualized, self-identical (core-)self comes out of a
particular modernist, i.e., Western view of the person (Hermans, 2001a, p. 240). For some
protagonists in cultural psychology the dialogical self sums up empirical aspects of an
interdependent self (Ho, Chan, Peng & Ng, 2001), others wonder whether the dialogical self
represents the state of mind of migrant people (Bhatia & Ram, 2001), for many others again, in
cultural psychology or social constructionism, the striving for a viable version of a non-individualist,
relational or dialogical self exemplifies psychologys greater efforts to let wither individualism and to
offer a relational concept of human functioning (Gergen, 1994, 1999; Hermans, 2001a; Straub &
Zielke, 2005). All these efforts seem legitimate as they help to adapt psychologys models to the
conditions of a world where inter- and transcultural dialogues have become an every day necessity.
Hubert Hermans has repeatedly stressed this analogy: If the self is depicted as a society, the
growing complexity of the world goes hand in hand with the complexity of the self or, more directly:
Mixing and moving cultures require a dialogical self (Hermans, 2001b, p. 24).
Suitable for the challenge caused by the global condition, the dialogical self is structured
dialogically. It is a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I-positions occupied by the same
person, and these I-positions within the self may agree and disagree, interrogate, criticize, and
even ridicule one another, any position is like another person in the self, with his or her own
voiced or voiceable perspective (Hermans, 2001a, p. 248p). Reading further in Hermans
descriptions and definitions of the dialogical self, one has to conclude that the dialogical self not
only arises from or is made possible by the multiple dialogues it contains, but is itself a dialogue or a
number of dialogues, representing a persons communication process with others in a society of
mind (Hermans, 2002, p. 147).2
Consequently, in order to understand the dialogical self it is crucial to understand the model of
dialogue implied in its description. In search of this understanding, I want to ask about the nature of
dialogue more generally: How are viable dialogues across cultural differences possible, and do they
call for a new understanding of dialogical communication? What is the (new?) form of dialogical
interchange of todays world, especially as the idea of polyvocal dialogues has become popular?
What kind of polyvocal dialogue, we may finally ask, would furnish the perfect ground for a viable
dialogical self?
Constructionism: Dialogue as a transformative
medium of living together
Based on social constructionist premises, proposals have been made which press beyond the
traditional and problematic conception of communication or, more specifically, of dialogue as an
inter-subjective connection. These proposals critically reflect the problem of presupposed
understanding, and locate an alternative, viable account of dialogical interchange. The following
sections summarize important aspects of social constructionist and related theories of dialogue.
Kenneth Gergen has repeatedly argued that while thinking of mere conversation does not suffice to
understand the nature of dialogical interchange, the constructionist concept refuses to reduce
dialogue to the argumentative encounter of diverging positions or to a mediating practice (Gergen,
1999, p. 149; McNamee & Gergen, 1999, p. ix). The discourse genres commonly associated with
dialogue (like debating, mediating, bargaining) should be reconceptualized, as they all presuppose
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that dialogues take place between individual speakers seeking to communicate, and, in most cases,
to communicate in the sign of conflict or with the objective to overcome difference. Rather, we
should think of dialogue more broadly as a mutual coordination of action (Gergen, 1999, p.160).
This broad concept of dialogue is based on several challenging assumptions worthy of discussion. I
will sum up some of them in a nutshell first,  and then discuss some aspects in detail.
First of all and not surprisingly, constructionism bids farewell to the individual speaker as author of
meaning who still is too dominant in traditional concepts of dialogic interchange. Quite in line with
Bakhtin it is argued that any meaningful act is a result of relationship, of joint-action (Shotter,
1994) or of coordination of action (Gergen, 1999). Consequently, any speaker acting symbolically
towards some meaningful utterance is dependent on the concrete or generalized other. Sometimes
we even find the strong assumption that there is no meaning to a statement or an action unless it is
affirmed by the supplementary act of the other (Gergen, McNamee & Barrett, 2002). However, in
constructionism, affirmation is not lodged in inter-subjectivity, even mutual understanding does not
seem to be a condition of inter-subjective convergence at all. More fundamentally, social
understanding in general is referred to as a relational achievement embedded in coordinated
action (Gergen, 1999, p. 145) or as spontaneously responsive joint-action (Shotter, 2003, p.
455) wherein the author as individual agent is lost in the whirlpool of everyday lifes exchanging
and merging of positions. Applying this concept of dialogue, it is difficult to think of a non-dialogical
practice at all; consequently, another constructionist proposal is that there exists no monological
practice. As meaning always emerges from coordinated action and such action is always dependent
on supplementary action, i.e., any kind of practice is dialogical.
Moreover, dialogical practice is per definition multivoiced, as even when we seem to have only two
participants, there are always more voices, making up the one and the other position. And
certainly, the role of the participant in such dialogue is not that of the individual and self-determined
speaker, but that of a polyvocal performer. From the constructionist viewpoint it seems that the self
in dialogue is the sum of its relations (e.g. Gergen, 1999, p. 131f). The self always speaks with
many voices, and the position one may choose to defend at a time is just one from a range many
possible positions (Hermans, 2001b). Given the contingent and ephemeral character of any
speakers contribution, convincing the other or achieving a consensus among differing
argumentative positions can no longer be the benchmark of dialogue. Rather it seems that one
major challenge for the participants in dialogue (for the dialogical selves) is to give up the idea of
convincing the other or letting themselves be convinced. According to the constructionist model,
even the participants self-reflexivity is desired only in the sense of a distinct awareness of the
polyvocality of the speaker and the polysemy of meaning (Gergen, 1999, p. 162).
To sum up: the constructionist model of dialogue liberates itself from many modernist impasses or
constraints, above all from the illusion that dialogue means the exchange of formerly existent and
independent positions of consistent and coherent selves. In the constructionist alternative, dialogue
is seen as a transformative medium of living together (Roberts, 2002). Beyond being an instrument
for exchanging views, it is a medium fostering a special kind of relationship which helps us to move
beyond disconnected co-existence to a more promising way of moving on together. Let me end the
brief characterization of the constructionist standpoint here and turn to some critical questions.
Dialogue without a subject: may we separate the
normative from the descriptive?
From a critical psychological viewpoint, it can be argued that the very challenge of theorizing
dialogue arises from having to deal with an epistemic problem of mutual understanding and a
normative problem of discursive power, recognition and participation. This is especially challenging
as the normative and the descriptive frames seem to be interrelated in a contradictory manner: on
the one hand, a positive view of epistemic understanding (by way of installing objective truth, but
also by way of emphatic identification) is suspect of being implicitly linked to power claims. On the
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other hand, the assumption of incommensurability, the impossibility to understand and communicate
with different others, has also proved to be highly problematic as it implicitly presupposes distinct
entities of meaning and thus conceals the frayed and unfinished nature of cultural life forms (Renn,
2002).
While the constructionist perspective opposes any kind of universal discourse ethics, the moral
problem of some voices in dialogue being oppressed or drowned out by more powerful others is not
simply evaded. Constructionism here offers the concept of relational responsibility, the desired
attitude of the participants to invite and support as many different perspectives as possible to join
the dialogue (McNamee & Gergen, 1999; van der Haar & Hosking, 2004). Relational responsibility,
a regulative standard even constructionism is engaged with, is supposed to install a kind of ethical
principle for productive dialogues without claiming universally applicable criteria for the dealing with
conflict, difference or social power. It merely invites all participants to be as open for other positions
as possible: this will help to enhance dialogue and reduce fixation without imposing universal
standards. The concept is elegant: As dialogues loosen their binary structure, responsibility loses its
monadic taste. A species of curious openness towards all local and general others seems to be the
one tie that binds for constructionist theory of dialogue. Even though, of course, those relations will
shift and change their implications any minute, we should see that the constructionist proposal of
relational responsibility is itself a regulative criterion for good dialogue. It is a pragmatic criterion for
the to-be-desired model of dialogical action. In this it is similar to the modern project of discourse
ethics (Habermas, 1981). But while some similarities in scope are valued (Gergen, 1999),
Habermas approach is in the end declared void as it exploits itself at the bilge pumps of modernity:
It is accused of searching for an ideal model of discourse or of applying universalist rational
standards. Even the counterfactual presupposition of possible understanding or consensus as
a feature of the to-be-desired model of discourse (which is what Habermas model claims), it is
argued, is coercive and will narrow the way we may profit from a polyvocal and transformative
dialogue.
In addition, while traditional social psychology tends to overemphasize the perspective of the
individual (and thus systematically underestimates the proper dynamics of the social), we have seen
that social constructionist writings for good reason have bracketed the question of individual
experience in order to allow for a truly social psychological account of social process (Burr, 2003, p.
16). In terms of dialogue, however, this avoidance of the individual participants perspective at all
costs brings up new questions. For example, it remains unclear how the described polyvocal
speaker (who is rather a performer with many possible I-positions) can possibly be so fundamentally
anchored in social relationships or dialogues as it is called for by constructionist and other
anti-individualist accounts of successful dialogical existence.4
The implementation of the constructionist account of a viable, non-individualist conception of
dialogue as coordinated or joint action, leaves some questions concerning acknowledgement and
power, regulation and error, and  last not least  individual participation: First, if understanding is
not at all between persons, but rather a relational flow of coordinated meaning-making  how is a
dialogical practice to be distinguished from a rather indifferent cacophony, or from the anonymous
murmur of discourse (Foucault, 1972)? Second, can dialogues fail at all in this view? Or is mutual
coordination really a mere juxtaposition of indifferent voices, like Hermans formulated in the
original description of a dialogical self? Third, do the participants, like dialogical selves, exclusively
represent the intersection of multiple others (McNamee & Gergen, 1999, p. 22, similar: Hermans,
2001a) and does that mean that the difference between ego and alter dissolves completely? And
fourth, is it possible, with this concept of mutual coordination, to think of procedural criteria for
successful or failed mutual coordination? And if so, does the idea of relational responsibility
suffice? Last, but not least: if terms like conviction or power of argument lose their meaning
completely, what motivates the polyivocal self to engage in dialogue, especially with those who
defend a contradictory position towards relevant questions?
Without claiming completeness or systematic order, these questions may be worthwile pursueing,
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as they concern ongoing dialogues between persons or groups in multicultural societies as well as
those dialogues within which are constitutive for the dialogical self (Zielke, 2006). In the following
part of my paper I will trace these questions a bit further and demonstrate  coming back now to my
first introduction  that some clues on how to deal with them can be found in Michael Bakhtins
account of dialogue, dialogical selves and dialogical relations.
Dialogue and the promise of responsiveness
Many readings of dialogicality in psychological approaches concentrate on celebrating the
centrifugal forces of heteroglossia and multivocality. Dialogical being in the first place represents,
like Michael Billig put it, a continuing carnival of difference and disagreement, whereas the
single monologic voice of agreement is to be feared (1996, p. 18). Indeed, this tendency to
celebrate the centrifugal is especially to be studied in the writings on Rabelais (Bakhtin, 1965). The
carnivalesque promotes ambivalence as central experience, as unique means for opening up the
centripetal, hegemonic space of the single truth (Lachmann, 2003, p. 61). The centripetal force is
the tendency towards unification, univocality, and closure. Laughter and parody contain the
possibility of a complete withdrawal from the present order. The carnival self is clearly social and
eager to interact which others; as a temporary life form, always on limited appointment (see
Lachmann1987, p. 14). But as this type of self is discontinuous, radically context-dependent, it is
difficult to see why it needs to get involved in any deeper communication process with a specific
other. Or as literary theorist Caryl Emerson put it, clearly this self implies an endless stream of
others, but does not seem to do much with them (2006, p. 37). Some aspects of the parodying
speaker in the anarchical carnivalesque indeed remind of a flexible and polyvocal performer
idealized in some more liberal versions of a dialogical self. A performer whose intentions are
contingent and context-bound, whose (self-)reflexivity is reduced to a serene awareness of
containing potentially incommensurable, relatively autonomous voices within.
Whatever we may think of the pains and potentials of this version of a polyvocal self  when
appreciating the power of the centrifugal force and appropriating it for our theories of today, we
should not forget what kind of centripetal force Bakhtin was confronted with in his every day life: the
disruption of any productive ambivalence by hierarchical systems as the one he lived in.6 And while
dialogicality is a central element of the carnivalesque, a closer look into Bakhtins theory of the
novel, where the concept was first developed, gives access to another, a different and  in my view
 more relational view of dialogical interaction and dialogical selves.
In his book on Dostojevskys poetics, Bakhtin emphasizes the hermeneutics of daily life
(Bakhtin, 1979, p. 226), and the starting point for his theory of word meaning is the conversation
structure of the world, where responsive understanding is an essential factor (1979, p. 173).
At first sight, this does not make much of a difference: Here, too, meaning implies community and
otherness. Utterances and acts require awareness of the otherness of language in general and of
the otherness of given dialogue partners in particular (Holquist, 2003, p.187). Whenever I speak, the
other is already waiting, and this other is not a recipient with a passive role, she is not a distanced
other-for-me8, but an active and concrete interlocutor.
Here social scientists and cultural and social psychologists will feel reminded of George Herbert
Meads social philosophy (Nielsen, 2002). Indeed, from a social psychological point of view there
are most fundamental similarities insofar as self consciousness for Mead, too, arises from the ability
to estimate and take over the others expectations and projections of oneself, from the ability to see
oneself in the eye of the other. Unlike Mead, however, Bakhtin does not suggest that we need the
assumption of already shared meaning for communication and social interaction. Quite in contrast,
he suggests that we need the assumption of difference to begin to interact in the first place. This
provocative thought goes back to his earliest writings on moral philosophy and the psychology of
self. Every ethical act, says Bakhtin, is grounded in the awareness of difference (Bakhtin, 1993,
p. 13, see Bender, 1998). Given this awareness of difference and otherness, however, at the heart
of any dialogue there is the conviction that what is exchanged has meaning  and that there is a
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possible addressee who will respond. While understanding does not rely on identity of meaning, nor
is it easily acquired through empathic listening, it is also clear here that Bakhtin does not talk about
meaning as a fleshless result of anonymous performers, let alone about the mere aesthetic play of
signifiers. There must be more to it: there is a version of the generalized other always present, as
super-addressee (Holquist, 1990, p. 38), granting that I am plunged into constant interaction and
never can have my way completely. But as I am dependent on the other, the other is dependent on
me. Responsiveness thus is a matter of social and personal responsibility; the responsibility of
being in relation with others (in the sense of relational responsibility) and of being in relation with
oneself, which makes the relational self more than the sum of its relations or relationships.
In the subject-critical rhetorics of our times, we should say Bakhtins participant in dialogue 
Bakhtins dialogical self  is a decentred, but not erased subject (see Gardiner, 2003;
Mayerfeld-Bell, 1998). Responsiveness is the element in Bakthins theory which resists the
complete takeover of the socially dependent, but not determined speaker by the flexible, polyvocal,
and selfless performer; and responsiveness, too, resists the re-definition of dialogues as an
idealized, but indifferent juxtaposition of different voices.
The idea of responsiveness calls for an account of pluralistic, but not indifferent multivoiced
dialogues as a special kind of meaningful practice. We may develop this account in connection with
Bakhtins version of dialogism. For reasons mentioned above I hold that our psychological or social
philosophical conceptualization should deal  maybe beyond Bakhtins primary interest  with the
epistemic and the moral or ethical aspects of the dialogical challenge. In my view, both aspects are
bound together in a pragmatist reading of dialogism and of the dialogical self. In the following lines, I
will make three points in favour of this reading. First, I will refer to the assumption that dialogues rely
on a kind of shared practice (coordinated action in the words of Gergen) and show where my
view is different from that of social constructionism depicted above (1). Then I will argue for the
importance of having a notion of a non-dialogical practice, an idea of how dialogical interaction may
fail (2). Finally, I will try to fold this back into a view of the relationally and dialogically informed self
as a participant in social (and dialogical) practices (3).
Conclusion
(1) Most accounts of dialogical action at some point refer to the notion of common or shared
practice as the ground of dialogical action. The above mentioned constructionist proposals of
dialogue as generation of meaning by coordination of action (Gergen) or through joint action
(Shotter), are both closely connected to Wittgensteins pragmatist concept of word meaning being
generated/constituted in use, thus by the way words are used in a collective practice (Wittgenstein,
1953).8 Here I only whish to point to the question of criteria which have to be met by those who
participate in social practice. Are there such criteria anyway? The transformative nature of dialogue
depicted above rather seems to indicate the absence of regulations. If we look at the case of
intercultural dialogue as a prototypical example of dialogues where conflicting world views are at
stake it becomes obvious, too, that predefined criteria for deciding on the outcome or the perfect
process of a productive dialogue are flawed. Be it the illusion of having access to objective
criteria like truth, rational argument, or moral standard, or be it that of having genuine access to the
others world via emphatic understanding  whatever we elect as objective criteria for successful
intercultural dialogue is bound to contain ethnocentric universals, to presuppose a common world
view and to conceal the fact that one dialogue party defends their view of the matter and of the
other.
Those cases in particular are said to profit from the experience of a shared practice independent of
mutual understanding, let alone of rationally explained consensus. At best, the shared practice may
be based on some kind of implicit common ground needed for the coordination of action, which
cannot be made explicit (Polanyi, 1967). We may say that the fact that there is a common practice
functions as a kind of non-rationalist rationale for dialogical interaction.
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We should not forget, however, that being able to participate in a common practice claims some
kind of knowledge from the participants. While not subject to standards of logic or ethical principles
of communication, coordination of action is not void of any criteria. Participating in a socio-cultural
practice requires implicit knowledge of the application of cultural rules (for example the
knowing-how to separate a possible from an impossible supplementary in an ongoing dialogue). It is
this implicit rule application knowledge by which we have the chance to participate in a truly
transformative dialogue with different others, a dialogue that may transform our worldview and even
allow for common world disclosure, for the exclusively public space opening up whenever two or
more individuals share a common practice (Taylor 1985, p. 264.).9
It is implicit knowledge, too, by which the participants know when the participation in a shared
practice fails or is about to fail: in those cases where they experience such a radical disappointment
of expectations that they cannot think of any supplementary action and where they in the end are
bound to leave dialogue in order to reject, rationalize, or otherwise suppress the experience of not
being able to go on.
2) Let me give a short example to demonstrate the significance of this matter. In my work with
intercultural professionals in psychotherapy, a German therapist told me about a female Turkish
Islamic client who came to her practice. The woman, who was about thirty years of age, covered her
entire face save the eyes with a veil (tschador). The therapist, whom I had interviewed to report on
intercultural competence in psychotherapy, told me that this was not a case of misunderstanding,
but one of successful intercultural communication: I told her to take off the veil, as otherwise I
could not work with her. After I made this clear to her she reflected a short while and then took off
the veil. She accepted it and we could begin with our work. I do not want to discuss now the
problematic implications of making something clear to someone or accepting in terms of
intercultural understanding and in the face of the specific power-imbalance of the patient-therapists
dialogue. For the sake of argument, I want to focus only on the question of success or failure of
dialogue. One possible interpretation of the therapists rigid imposing her way is that she was very
close to the experience of not being able to go on. That she felt not seeing the face of her
counterpart would startle her so deeply that her professional expertise would leave her, that she
would lack implicit knowledge of how to apply her professional expertise in this context. Thus, she
felt the dialogical communication between patient and therapist in this case would fail and she
chose to avoid failure, to exclude the possibility of not being able to supplement the others actions.
Imposing her law of dialogue (no veils), the therapist ensured that the interaction could continue at
the cost of recognizing difference and thus of a potential enhancement of her clinical expertise. Of
course, there are many reasonable motives, even professional ethics, which may have brought the
therapist to do so. But I think that this example reminds us of the difficulty of just sharing practice
in case of radical difference. It draws our attention to the startling and destabilizing effects of facing
radical difference  and to the possibility of the failure of dialogue.
Let us take the freedom to consider the other option: what happens when I do not exclude the
experience of failure, neither from the real dialogues in my life world, nor from my theoretical model
of dialogue? Can we even valuate the possibility of failure as a central element of dialogical
practice? After all, in some cases the experience of failure is the key for perceiving difference which
otherwise would remain veiled (as was the case in the therapy session). In this sense failure is a
crucial challenge for transformative dialogues. We may remain with Bakhtin and say: The
experience of failure is the central challenge to change. It is the chance to know that there is
difference in the first place and then to be responsive towards otherness  sometimes at the cost of
not knowing how to go on. What John Shotter envisioned as the responsive quality of joint action
(Shotter, 1993) will have to include a notion of failure in one formulation or another if responsive is
to mean more than indifferent listening.
Consequently, the possibility of the experience of failure is the missing theoretical link between
consensus and cacophony for a concept of dialogue which avoids levelling differences or idealizing
common understanding, but which allows for participants to be in a relationally responsive
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relationship. Further, and with this I return to the self in dialogue: the insight into the responsive
quality of the dialogical act also changes the idea of the participants stake in
meaning-constitutive, transformative dialogues. Why should we engage in dialogue after all?
3) Empirically, we engage in dialogue because the subject of conversation means something to us.
Philosophically we may discuss the question of a specific intentional quality of the way mental
states and events are about other things (Dennett, 1987), the criterion for aboutness being that
those things matter to the agent.
Why should I change my view of the world, if I may only add it to the sum of other views? Why
should I change my cultural construction of the world and of the self in the face of experiencing
difference  just in order to enhance my repertoire of possible I-positions? Plurality alone will not
motivate as long as I do not know for the sake of what I should acquire it.10 Participants do not only
engage in an aesthetic play when engaging in dialogue: they need to solve problems and make
ends meet. Pragmatic criteria like the primacy of problem solving are not the main aspect of the
participants aboutness as a condition of dialogue. The understanding of dialogue as a permanent
experience of otherness (in the sense of Bakhtin) makes the experience of failure a condition of
dialogue. In search for the other, I search for failure  knowing that this is the only way to change
and the only chance to participate in the co-constitution of new worlds with different others.
Participants do engage in this search not despite, but because they are post-souvereign,
de-centered subjects (Butler, 1997).11 De-centering the self is not giving up identity. For good
reason, identity, continuity, coherence and hence autonomy of the self have been undermined.
They can never be fully and definitively reached. But this insight by no means renders the
paradoxically structured aspiration, the striving for identity superfluous or obsolete.
I hope to have explained that neither aboutness nor responsiveness are exclusive qualities or
competencies of the individual subject; both are also constitutive elements of a dialogical practice.
They are what makes the dialogical co-constitution of meaning different from the murmur of
discourse and from the anonymous, endless play of signifiers. A model of transformative dialogue
requires a definition of the participants stake in dialogue: their critical assessment, their
commitment (aboutness) and, maybe, even their personal aspiration of a transitoric identity worth
defending, explaining and hopefully: changing (Renn & Straub 2002; Straub & Zielke, 2005).
Granted, in comparison to the idealized multi-voiced polyvocal self choosing from an enormous
range of possible positions in dialogue, the endeavouring participant I envisioned here may seem
constrained and sometimes anxious. Wanting to achieve what cannot be attained and is at best
present in the modus of denial  and remaining calm in this paradox situation  is probably one of
the most challenging tasks for the self. But whatever we may think about the anxious constraints of
this participant: at least we may say of her pains that they matter to her  if only in the sense of
Samuel Beckett, who, in his late and enigmatic prose piece Worstward Ho (1983), expressed his
aspirations towards the identity project of being a good writer with an apparently paradoxical
challenge: Try again. Fail again. Fail better.
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Endnotes
1 A good insight into the ongoing transdisciplinary discussion of the dialogical self can be achieved
at the biannual international meetings of the International Society for Dialogical Science (ISDS) or
via the electronic, multidisciplinary International Journal of Dialogical Science (IJDS).
2 For a more detailed discussion of the dialogical self as a dialogue within the person see Zielke,
2006.
3 In his contribution to this volume, Gergen pursues some of these questions in more detail.
4 For a number of connected questions concerning the viability of a non-individualist self see Zielke
& Straub, 2007, p. 340.
5 Both the concept of dialogue and that of polyvocality have been overstressed and almost
stereotyped into catchwords by some all too inclusive interpretations (and translations), the
concepts themselves being wide and not selective in the original. This will not keep me from trying
to provide a specific reading of them I hold to be helpful. But I am aware that all interpretations are
biased, all translations make mistakes and that, as Bakhtin translator and theorist Caryl Emerson
puts it, famous peole will always generate myth (2006, p. 25).
6 Bakhtin was banished from the centre of official Soviet culture and recognized the emancipatory
power of that which pulls away from the centre. While he also had some experience with the
centripetal force  in literature and politics, he lived through the revolutionary euphoria of the 1920s,
participated in a text culture that promised and practiced openness, de-hierarchization,
hybridization.  At the same time he could watch the soviet society increase closure and
hierarchization. For him (and in contrast to many) the experience of revolution, of the
post-revolutionary avant-garde in Russia meant the experience of plurality of worlds, intercrossing
of cultures: this experience determined his approach to Rabelais (see Lachmann, 1990, p. 61).
7 i.e., the picture I make of the other, judging their outward, behavioral appearance, tin other words:
my projection of the other (see Bakhtin, 1965).
8 I refer to some problems of a relativistic reading of Wittgensteins pragmatist concept of word
meaning in social constructionism and to the concepts possible implications for the individual
agents role in Zielke, 2004, Chapter 4.
9 This public space for Taylor, is to be specified as a tacit common ground (1985, p. 264); it is an
element of language, but not part of the explicit, but the implicit linguistic knowledge. Reaching
beyond Wittgenstein, Taylor emphasizes that this public space, a space of shared meaning, to
which neither participant has access without the other, will eventually change the cultural language
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of either side.
10 Similar to aboutness, but pretentious, is Heideggers Worumwillen (for-the-sake-of-which) (
Heidegger, 1996).
11 Judith Butlers subject-critical account employs Freuds idea of melancholy (Butler, 1997) and
its re-orientation against the Law of the Father (Lacan, 1991). The post-sovereign subject knows
that it is not autonomous, but not determined either. The subconscious and refused loss which
shows in the melancholic structure of the post-souvereign subject implies the rebellion of this
subject against this Law  and thus, the subconscious mode of resistance. The societal, discursive
power may regulate what is to be grieved upon, but it is not always as effective as it wants to be.
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